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ABSTRACT2
Presuppositions and scalar implicatures are traditionally considered to be distinct phenomena,3
but recent accounts analyze (at least some of) the former as the latter. All else being equal, this4
‘scalar implicature approach to presuppositions’ predicts uniform behavior for the two types of5
inferences. Initial experimental studies comparing them yielded conflicting results. While some6
found a difference in the Response Time (RT) patterns of scalar implicatures and presuppositions,7
others found them to be uniform. We argue that the difference in outcomes is attributable to a8
difference in the type of response being measured: RTs associated with acceptance and rejection9
responses seem to pattern in opposite ways. Next, we report on a series of experiments to support10
this, and to compare the behavior of the two inferences more comprehensively. Experiments11
Ia and Ib look at both acceptance and rejection responses for both inference types, and find12
uniform patterns once the acceptance vs. rejection variable is factored in. Experiment II adds13
a new dimension by testing for the influence of prosody on the two inference types, and in this14
regard a clear difference between them emerges, posing a first substantive challenge to the15
scalar implicature approach to presuppositions. A third set of experiments investigates yet another16
prediction of this approach, according to which the presuppositional inference is introduced as a17
simple entailment in affirmative contexts. This predicts that these presuppositional inferences18
behave parallel to other entailments. Experiment IIIa compares rejections of affirmative sentences19
based on either their presuppositional inference or their entailed content and finds that they20
differ, with greater RTs for the former. As an additional control, Experiments IIIb and IIIc test for21
parallel differences between two entailments associated with always, which yield uniform results.22
In sum, while Experiments Ia and Ib are in line with previous findings that presuppositions and23
scalar implicatures under negation show uniform response time patterns, the differences found24
in Experiments II and IIIa-c pose a substantial challenge to approaches assimilating the two25
phenomena, while being entirely in line with the traditional perspective of seeing them as distinct.26
Keywords: Scalar Implicature, Presupposition, Inference, Processing, Semantics, Pragmatics27
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper experimentally compares two central linguistic inference types, namely Presuppositions (Ps) and28
Scalar Implicatures (SIs). Traditional approaches treat these as entirely distinct categories (Heim 1982; van29
der Sandt 1992; Beaver 2001 among many others). But recent approaches, building on a line of work going30
back to Gazdar 1979 and Wilson 1975 (among others), analyze at least certain presuppositions as scalar31
implicatures, largely motivated by the need to account for varying behavior of different presupposition32
triggers (Abrusa´n 2011; Abusch 2002, 2010; Simons 2001; Chemla 2009, 2010; Romoli 2012, 2015).1 We33
begin with a sketch of the si possible form of this overall approach, directly assimilating scalar implicatures34
and presuppositions, which we refer to as the‘SI approach to Ps,’ and whose two core properties are35
schematized in (1-a) and (1-b).236
(1) Properties:37
a. In affirmative contexts, Ps are simply entailments.338
b. In all other contexts (e.g., under negation), Ps are derived as SIs.39
To illustrate (1-a), the presuppositional inference in (2-b) arising from (2-a), is a simple entailment40
according to this approach, just as (3-b) is an entailment of (3-a).441
(2) a. John stopped going to the movies.42
b.  John used to go to the movies43
(3) a. John always went to the movies.44
b.  John sometimes went to the movies45
Turning to the property in (1-b), the inference in (4-b), arising from the sentence in (4-a), is derived as an46
SI in contexts like negation, parallel to the derivation of (5-b) from (5-a).47
(4) a. John didn’t stop going to the movies.48
b.  John used to go to the movies49
(5) a. John didn’t always go to the movies.50
b.  John sometimes went to the movies51
Two predictions that follow from the properties above are (6-a) and (6-b):52
(6)
1 Note that such approaches commonly differentiate between different types of presupposition triggers, and only propose to treat the inferences of a sub-class of
traditional presupposition triggers as implicatures. Given our focus on triggers in the relevant sub-class, we simply refer to them as Ps here.
2 Many of the proposals in the literature mentioned above depart from this strong version of the approach to some extent, by re-introducing some elements of
difference between implicatures and presuppositions (for instance, Chemla (2010) assumes that they differ in the alternatives they involve and their discourse
properties, while Romoli (2015) argues that there is a difference between the two in terms of obligatoriness of the inference). These elements might affect the
predictions in relation to the properties in (1-a) and (1-b) in different ways. We think that it is nonetheless useful to test experimentally the prediction of the
strongest and most ambitious version of the approach and then take the results of that as a quantitative base to evaluate if and where a departure is needed from
simply assimilating scalar implicatures and presuppositions. Recent pragmatic accounts to presuppositions like that in Schlenker 2008 also derive them in terms
of conversational reasoning, though not equating them with scalar implicatures. This type of account makes non-trivial predictions in relation to the processing
of presuppositions. Despite this distinction, we group it with the ‘traditional approach’ here and leave explorations of these predictions for further research.
3 Traditional accounts are compatible with the assumption that presuppositional inferences in affirmative contexts are entailments, in addition to being
presupposed, though this isn’t necessarily extended to all presupposition triggers (see Sudo 2012 for discussion).
4 The entailment from (3-a) to (3-b) actually involves some complications: in order for it to go through one has to assume that the restrictor of the universal
quantifier always is non-empty. We leave this aside here, as it is orthogonal to our purposes; for discussion see Heim and Kratzer 1998, chapter 6.
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Predictions: All else being equal,53
a. in affirmative contexts, Ps and entailments should display uniform behavior.54
b. in all other contexts, Ps and SIs should display uniform behavior.55
We tested these predictions by comparing Ps to simple entailments, on the one hand, and to SIs, on the56
other. Specifically, we focus on the predictions in (6), in order to answer the question in (7). A positive57
answer to this question would be challenging for a unified approach to SIs and Ps, at least in its strongest58
version.559
(7) Main question: Do behavior patterns yield evidence for a distinction between Ps and entailments60
in affirmative contexts and between Ps and SIs in other contexts?61
Previous studies in the literature have focused on the prediction in (6-b), comparing SIs and Ps directly,62
and have produced results that run against this prediction, based on delays in RTs found for SIs (Bott and63
Noveck 2004 and much subsequent work) on the one hand, and recent reports of the opposite pattern for Ps64
(Chemla and Bott 2013). We begin our discussion below with a review of these findings and contrast them65
with some other recent results reported by Romoli and Schwarz (2015), which found uniform RT patterns66
for Ps and SIs. We then argue, following a similar point made by Cremers and Chemla (2014), that the67
source of the difference in the results on Ps could well be due to a confound, namely a difference in terms68
of the types of responses — acceptances vs. rejections — being measured.69
This motivates the first series of experiments reported here, which further extend the comparison between70
SIs and Ps. The results from Experiments Ia and Ib reconcile the conflicts between previous findings71
and show that once we look systematically at both acceptance and rejection responses, the evidence for72
a difference between Ps and SIs in RTs disappears. Thus, comparisons of RT patterns of the sort first73
employed in the study of SIs, testing the prediction in (6-b), do not challenge the SI approach to Ps.74
However, Experiment II clearly differentiates the two inference types by looking at the impact of prosodic75
stress on the inference-triggering expressions, which yields opposite effects for SIs and Ps. This poses a76
first challenge to the SI approach to Ps. An additional finding from our response time studies is that we do77
not replicate the previously reported general delays associated with SIs (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004).78
We then shift our attention to the prediction in (6-a) and report a third series of experiments that follow79
an approach presented in Kim (2007) and Schwarz (2016b). That is, these experiments look at rejections of80
sentences based on either their presuppositional inferences or their entailments. We find longer RTs for the81
former, which runs against the prediction in (6-a) and poses a second challenge to the SI approach to Ps.82
5 Let us emphasize here the ‘all else being equal’ element of these predictions. That is, these predictions are only claimed to apply in situations where the
properties of the relevant meanings are as close to each other as possible. This is important as it increases the likelihood that any difference in the behavior
patterns of the inferences is genuinely a result of the inferences being of different types. In line with this, we compared triggers that are as similar to each other
as possible. Moreover, we would note that in our experiments the nature of the uniformity predicted in (6-a) and (6-b) varies somewhat depending on how close
the situation is to the ideal of all else being equal. For example, in Experiment Ia and Ib we compare the processing profiles of three inferences that, according
to the SI approach to Ps, are all derived as SIs. Despite this common derivational mechanism, there are other dimensions on which the relevant triggers vary
(e.g., presence of negation), as a result, we take the ‘uniformity’ predicted by this approach to hold at a fairly general level. Specifically, for these experiments
we test the prediction that, for each trigger, there will be uniformity in the general processing pattern produced when comparing responses motivated by an
inference-based interpretation to responses based on a literal interpretation. At the beginning of each experiment we identify and justify the degree of behavioral
uniformity predicted by the SI approach to Ps for the situation under investigation. Finally, in connection to the qualifications above, we also should make
make note of work on ‘scalar diversity’ in the implicature literature, which has found differences across different scalar terms (Van Tiel et al. 2016, among
others). The differences that have been found so far have chiefly been in the realm of inference derivation rates, but it is in principle possible for there to be
within-inference variation in regards to other aspects of behavior as well. Nonetheless, when considering the strong version of the SI approach to Ps, outlined
above, the differences we do find between SIs and Ps are not readily explained by scalar diversity. We will return to this later when discussing one such result,
which is generated by Experiment II.
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In sum, the results of Experiment II and those of Experiment IIIa-c challenge the SI approach to Ps83
by revealing differences between them where this approach predicts uniform behavior. This is further84
corroborated by differences between SIs and Ps found in previous work on language acquisition and85
language disorders (Bill et al., 2016; Kennedy et al., 2014). The overall evidence, then, is not in line with86
the predictions of the SI approach to Ps, as outlined in (6-a) and (6-b).87
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical background on SIs, Ps, and the88
SI approach to Ps. In section 3, we discuss previous work on the processing of SIs and Ps and in particular89
those results taken as evidence for a difference between Ps and SIs. In section 4, we report our new series90
of experiments and in section 5 we discuss their implications for our main question and the processing of91
SIs and Ps. Section 6 closes the paper with some general conclusions.92
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 The phenomena93
Ps and SIs are inferences associated with certain expressions that go beyond the core lexically encoded,94
truth-conditional meaning. (8) and (9), repeated from above, illustrate inferences that are traditionally95
analysed as Ps and SIs, respectively.96
(8) a. John didn’t stop going to the movies.97
b.  John used to go to the movies98
(9) a. John didn’t always go to the movies.99
b.  John sometimes went to the movies100
We focus on cases like (8) and (9) in particular, as they are maximally parallel, at least on the surface, in101
involving negation. But we also consider more standard cases of SIs in affirmative sentences such as (10).102
Sometimes the SIs in (9) and that in (10) are distinguished terminologically as “indirect” and “direct” ones103
(Chierchia 2004), and we will adopt this terminology.6104
(10) a. John sometimes went to the movies.105
b.  John didn’t always go to the movies106
One shared property of all these inferences is that they are not obligatorily present. In other words, in107
addition to “inference readings” illustrated above, all these sentences can have a “no-inference” reading108
as well, where the inference is absent. Consider (11) as compared to (8): the felicity of the continuation109
illustrates that the inference that John used to go to the movies is not necessarily present. The same goes110
for (12) and (13) and their inferences that John sometimes went to the movies and that he didn’t always go,111
respectively.112
(11) John didn’t stop going to the movies . . . he never went!113
(12) John didn’t always go to the movies . . . (in fact) he never went!114
(13)
6 Roughly, the distinction is as follows: a direct SI is an SI arising from a weak scalar term in an upward entailing context and an indirect SI is one arising from
a strong scalar term in a downward entailing context, such as the scope of negation. As we will see below, this distinction is purely terminological, as all theories
of SIs that we know of treat direct and indirect SIs in the same way.
This is a provisional file, not the final typeset article 4
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John sometimes went to the movies . . . (in fact) he always went!115
This property, of course, is not shared by all inferences: in the case of a regular entailment like (14-b) of the116
sentence in (14-a), any attempt to suspend the inference, as in (15), results in infelicity, and the sentence117
sounds contradictory.118
(14) a. John and Mary went to the movies.119
b.  John went to the movies120
(15) John and Mary went to the movies . . . #(in fact) John didn’t go!121
In light of this property any theory of SIs and Ps, unified or not, requires an account of (i) how these122
inferences arise to account for the inference readings, while (ii) also allowing for no-inference readings. In123
the next section, we briefly sketch how traditional approaches handle this challenge for SIs and Ps.124
2.2 The traditional approach125
In sketching standard analyses of Ps and SIs, we focus on the traditional approach, but for present126
purposes any account, old or new, which treats presuppositions and scalar implicatures as different falls in127
same class as the traditional perspective.128
2.2.1 Presuppositions129
Considering Ps first: the traditional approach is to analyse them as definedness conditions on admissible130
conversational contexts for the sentence carrying the presupposition. The gist of the idea is that a sentence131
like (16-a) is only felicitous in a context in which the presupposition in (16-b) is already assumed to132
be mutually accepted by the discourse participants (Stalnaker 1974; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1982, 1983;133
see also Beaver and Geurts 2012; Schwarz 2015; Romoli and Sauerland 2015 for an introduction to134
presuppositions).135
(16) a. John stopped going to the movies.136
b.  John used to go to the movies137
In addition, an account of the so called ‘projection’ behavior of presuppositions is needed to explain138
how the presupposition of a sentence like (16-a) appears to be “inherited” by more complex sentences139
containing (16-a) such as (17), repeated from above.140
(17) John didn’t stop going to the movies.141
Note that (16-a) and its negation in (17) both have the same presupposition that John used to go to the142
movies; in the traditional terminology, the presupposition of (16-a) in (16-b) ‘projects’ from the scope of143
negation in (17). Projection is not limited to negation, but is a general pattern involving all sorts of complex144
embeddings. For instance, the presupposition of (16-a) is also inherited by conditional sentences containing145
(16-a) in their antecedent, as well as questions or modal embedding (16-a): all of (18)-(20) standardly give146
rise to the inference that John used to go to the movies. In contrast, none of them convey that John is not147
going to the movies now, as entailments are interpreted relative to the embedding operators.148
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(18) If John stopped going to the movies, he must have gone to the gym more regularly.149
(19) Did John stop going to the movies?150
(20) John might have stopped going to the movies.151
There are various well-developed proposals for accounting for presupposition projection in traditional152
terms, but we will not review these here in any detail for reasons of space. What is crucial for us, as before,153
is that all of these accounts treat presuppositions in a way that is very different from their treatment of SIs.154
Finally, notice that traditional approaches quite generally assume presuppositions to be conventionally155
encoded in the lexical entries of the relevant expressions. This means that sentences containing a156
presupposition trigger necessarily introduce the corresponding presupposition. In order to reconcile157
this with cases of apparent suspension of presuppositions, as in (21), a further mechanism is assumed,158
e.g. one that ‘accommodates’ the presupposition locally, which results in the absence of any contextual159
constraints at the sentence level (Heim 1983; see also von Fintel 2008). This gives rise to the meaning160
paraphrased in (22), which is compatible with the continuation of (21), asserting that John never went to161
the movies.162
(21) John didn’t stop going to the movies . . . he never went!163
(22) It’s not true that (John used to go to the movies and stopped)164
(≈ Either John didn’t use to go to the movies or he didn’t stop)165
2.2.2 Scalar Implicatures166
The traditional approach to SIs, which sees them as distinct from Ps, goes back to Grice (1975) and Horn167
(1972). On this approach, SIs can be understood as arising from the hearer reasoning about the speaker’s168
communicative intentions. Take the inference in (23-b) based on (23-a).169
(23) a. John sometimes went to the movies.170
b.  John didn’t always go to the movies171
In brief, the idea is that the hearer reasons that the speaker said (23-a), rather than something else, and172
in particular the more informative sentence in (24). Assuming that (24) is relevant to the purposes of the173
conversation, and that speakers are assumed to be committed to conveying the most informative relevant174
information at their disposal, the hearer will infer that the speaker’s reason for not saying (24) is that the175
speaker believes (24) to be false. Therefore, the hearer derives the inference (23-b).7176
(24) John always went to the movies.177
A parallel line of reasoning, can be used to derive the indirect SI in (25-b) from (25-a). The hearer reasons178
that the speaker said (25-a), rather than the relevant and more informative (26). Therefore, the hearer infers179
that (26) is false, i.e., (25-b).180
(25) a.
7 We are skipping over a variety of details and assumptions here. See Gamut 1991 for a precise discussion of all the assumptions needed here to derive this
inference.
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John didn’t always go to the movies.181
b.  John sometimes went to the movies182
(26) John didn’t sometimes go to the movies (≈ John never went to the movies)183
This brief review of the traditional perspective on Ps and SIs, while glossing over many intricacies, will184
suffice for our purposes. We primarily wish to provide a sense of how Ps and SIs are traditionally analyzed185
in clearly distinct ways. We now turn to more recent accounts of these inferences, in particular the SI186
approach to Ps.187
2.3 The scalar implicature approach to presuppositions188
The scalar implicature approach to presuppositions generally attempts to assimilate (certain)189
presuppositions to implicatures. In particular, some of the accounts within this general approach treat the190
presupposition associated with verbs like ‘stop’ as scalar implicatures of a sort (Simons, 2001; Abusch,191
2002, 2010; Chemla, 2010; Romoli, 2012, 2015). In this section, we briefly sketch the strongest version of192
this approach focusing on sentences like (27-a) and its associated inference in (27-b):193
(27) a. John didn’t stop going to the movies.194
b.  John used to go to the movies195
Recall that one of the main phenomena to be accounted for is how the presuppositional inference of ‘stop’196
arises from both affirmative and negated sentences. As mentioned, the traditional explanation is that (28),197
by virtue of the lexical entry of ‘stop’, is associated with the presupposition in (27-b), which then projects198
from the scope of negation in (27-a).199
(28) John stopped going to the movies.200
The SI approach to Ps offers a rather different explanation. First, (27-b) is simply (and only) an entailment201
of (28) on this account. This is in line with the observation that (27-b) is a non-cancelable ingredient of the202
overall meaning of (28), as asserting (28) and negating (27-b) sounds contradictory.203
(29) #John stopped going to the movies but in fact he never went.204
Assuming that (27-b) is an entailment of (28) is neither novel nor surprising: many accounts of Ps in the205
traditional approach share the view that the presuppositional inference is entailed in affirmative contexts.206
What is novel in the SI approach to Ps is to argue that (27-b) is only an entailment of (28). Second, the207
fact that (27-b) is standardly inferred from negated sentences like (27-a) as well is derived as a scalar208
implicature in a fashion parallel to the reasoning above for standard SIs. In particular, the idea is that the209
speaker said (27-a) rather than the relevant and more informative sentence (30). Therefore, the hearer infers210
that the speaker believes the latter to be false, which is equivalent to (27-b).211
(30) John didn’t use to go to the movies.212
If this approach is correct, then the inferences associated with soft triggers such as stop are simply213
entailments when occurring in affirmative contexts, but (indirect) SIs when occurring under negation,214
Frontiers 7
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leading to the two key predictions in (6-a) and (6-b) above. On this view, verbs like stop are completely215
parallel to strong scalar items like always, which give rise to parallel inferences in positive contexts and in216
the scope of negation.217
3 THE PROCESSING OF SCALAR IMPLICATURES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
In this section, we briefly review previous work on the processing of SIs and Ps, focusing in particular on218
RT experiments.8219
3.1 The processing of SIs220
In recent years, research on scalar implicatures has undergone what Chemla and Singh (2014) call an221
‘experimental turn.’ In particular, investigations of their processing properties have played a central role222
in the overall theoretical discussion. Most studies have focused on direct SIs but some recent studies223
have started looking at indirect ones, too. In a seminal paper, Bott and Noveck (2004) argue that SIs are224
associated with a delay in RTs. They investigated sentences like (31-a) and their direct SI in (31-b), which225
directly conflicts with common knowledge (as in fact all elephants are mammals). Based on the inference226
reading of the sentence, (31-a) should thus be judged ‘false.’9 As discussed above, however, the sentence227
also has a no-inference (or ‘literal’) ‘some and possibly all’ reading, which is compatible with common228
knowledge, and thus should lead to a ‘true’ judgment.229
(31) a. Some elephants are mammals.230
b.  Not all elephants are mammals231
The logic of the design in Bott and Noveck (2004) then is as follows: since ‘false’ responses are indicative232
of inference interpretations and ‘true’ responses of no-inference interpretations, measuring RTs for both233
types of responses should shed light on the time course of the availability of the two interpretations.10 Their234
main finding, schematically represented in (32) (with > indicating greater RTs) is that false responses were235
slower than true responses. They interpret this delay as showing that the computation of scalar implicatures236
involves additional processing efforts that go beyond those involved in the computation of literal meaning.237
(32) Bott & Noveck on DSIs238
inference readings > no-inference readings239
One particularly relevant version of their general approach trains participants prior to the main task to240
respond according to one or the other possible interpretations of the sentence in question. They find that241
participants that were trained to respond based on the no-inference interpretation were generally faster than242
those trained on the inference interpretation. Parallel results have been obtained in various similar studies243
since (Bott, Bailey, and Grodner 2012, among others), and also for implicatures associated with disjunction244
(Chevallier, Noveck, Nazir, Bott, Lanzetti, and Sperber, 2008). Other methodologies, such as reading times245
8 This section is adapted from Schwarz et al. (2015).
9 Notice that the sentence in (31-a) is generally found to be somewhat odd, as is generally the case when scalar implicatures conflict with common knowledge
(Magri 2010). This feature of the design is however shown not to be important in work replicating the main result of Bott and Noveck (2004), like that of Bott
et al. (2012).
10 There is an obvious potential concern about general difference between the time course of true and false responses, which Bott & Noveck try to address
through different variants of their basic design. We will return to this issue when introducing our own study below.
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(Breheny, Katsos, and Williams, 2006) and visual world eye tracking (Huang and Snedeker 2009b and246
following work) have yielded comparable results as well.11247
Cremers and Chemla (2014) extend Bott and Noveck’s approach to indirect scalar implicatures by looking248
at sentences like (33-a), with the inference in (33-b), which is again incompatible with common knowledge.249
(33) a. Not all elephants are reptiles250
b.  Some elephants are reptiles251
Overall, they argue their findings to be parallel to Bott and Noveck’s results, in that training participants to252
respond based on an inference interpretation vs. a no-inference interpretation gives yields slower responses253
for responses based on inference-readings than those based on no-inference readings:254
(34) Cremers and Chemla on ISIs255
inference > no-inference.256
Note, however, that Cremers and Chemla (2014) report two experiments, with prima facie conflicting results.257
In the first one, without training, they actually found opposite results for DSIs and ISIs, as participants’258
‘false’ responses were faster than ‘true’ responses for ISIs. However, they argue that this outcome is the259
result of confounds in the materials. First, subjects may have calculated implicatures for controls as well,260
due to the specifics of the overall stimuli in the experiment. Secondly, DSIs and ISIs differ in whether they261
contain ‘matching’ or ‘mismatching’ animal names and categories (e.g., elephant paired with mammals262
and reptiles respectively). Their second experiment avoided these confounds and statistically controlled263
for effects of polarity and truth value, and yielded results in line with those for DSIs, leading to the264
interpretation of their overall results outlined above. We will return to some related issues when discussing265
the investigation of Ps by Chemla and Bott (2013) below.266
In sum, Bott and Noveck found that ‘false’ responses based on inference readings for direct SIs were267
slower than ‘true’ responses based on no-inference interpretations. Similarly, Cremers and Chemla found268
that ‘false’ responses based on inference readings for indirect SI were slower in comparison to ‘true’269
responses based on no-inference readings. These results are in line with the general uniformity for direct270
and indirect SIs assumed in the literature, and with the initial interpretation by Bott and Noveck that scalar271
implicatures are associated with a delay.272
3.2 The processing of Ps273
The processing of Ps has been studied less than that of SIs. However, a number of recent studies have274
begun to fill this gap, using various processing measures to investigate Ps (see Schwarz 2015, 2016a). In275
this section, we review two recent RT studies on Ps that are directly relevant for our purposes. The first,276
by Chemla and Bott (2013), uses the paradigm of Bott and Noveck (2004) to look at Ps under negation,277
and yields results that appear to be very different from those for SIs. The second, by Romoli and Schwarz278
(2015), compares Ps (under negation) and (indirect) SIs directly and finds uniform RT patterns. These279
two results appear to be in direct conflict with one another and thus suggest opposite answers to our main280
question about the relationship between Ps and SIs. We discuss a possible source of the difference in281
outcomes, which motivates the first set of experiments reported below.282
11 Although other researchers have found different results using visual world eye tracking, which suggest implicatures are immediately available (e.g., Grodner
et al. 2010; Breheny et al. 2013; Foppolo and Marelli 2017).
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3.2.1 Chemla and Bott 2013283
Chemla and Bott (2013) adapts the paradigm from Bott and Noveck (2004) to investigate Ps. The logic284
is entirely parallel: subjects judge sentences like (35-a) with the factive verb ‘realise’ (or, in their first285
experiment, ‘know’), which gives rise to the presupposition in (35-b). This presupposition conflicts with286
common knowledge, and therefore, the sentence in (35-a) is only true on a no-inference reading.287
(35) a. Zoologists did not realize that Elephants are reptiles.288
b.  Elephants are reptiles289
Comparing the RTs of True vs. False responses provides a measure of comparison between the inference290
readings and the no-inference readings. Prima facie, their results suggest the opposite pattern of that found291
for SIs by Bott and Noveck (2004): True responses were slower than false responses, i.e., inference readings292
were faster than no-inference readings:293
(36) Bott and Chemla on Ps294
inference readings < no-inference readings295
The interpretation proposed by Chemla and Bott (2013) is that the computation of P-inferences, unlike296
that of SI-inferences, does not incur a delay, suggesting that the inferences involved are different, at least297
in the way they are processed. This poses a challenge for the SI approach to Ps. Note however, that the298
confound from the first experiment by Cremers and Chemla (2014) arising for indirect SIs is relevant for299
the present results for Ps as well: recall that the indirect SI materials involved a mismatch with respect to300
the relationship between the name of the animals mentioned (e.g., elephants paired with reptiles), which301
the authors argue might have hindered acceptance of sentences like (33-a). Recall also, that for direct SIs,302
the relevant targets instead involve a match between name and category, so conversely this might have303
facilitated the acceptance of sentences like (37).304
(37) Some elephants are mammals.305
Turning back to the experiment in Chemla and Bott (2013), it is entirely parallel with the situation in306
Cremers and Chemla (2014). That is, unlike in Bott and Noveck, the target sentences in Chemla and Bott307
(2013), such as (35-a), involve a mismatch between the name and the category. As suggested by Cremers308
and Chemla (2014) for their own results, this factor could have influenced the results of Chemla and Bott309
(2013). That is, the increased RTs associated with no-inference readings could have been caused by this310
mismatch, rather than different derivational mechanisms. The existence of this potential confound means311
that the results in Chemla and Bott 2013 have to be interpreted with caution, and without implementing312
the same kinds of control techniques as Cremers and Chemla (2014) use in experiment 2, they do not313
conclusively establish any difference between SIs and Ps.314
3.2.2 Romoli and Schwarz 2015315
Recently, in a study by Romoli and Schwarz (2015) RTs for Ps and SIs under negation were directly316
compared to one another. In this study, instead of a direct truth-value judgment task, a version of a sentence317
picture matching task was used (Huang et al., 2013). This paradigm records both response choices and318
response times as dependent variables. A sentence was presented to participants and they were directed319
to pick a picture, from a set of three, that best matched the sentence. Each of the pictures depicted an320
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WedTues Thur FriMon
Always-Target (+LIT/+INF)
WedTues Thur FriMon
Always-Target (+LIT/-INF)
Figure 1. Target pictures for always conditions, matched with a sentence like (38).
individual and a 5-day calendar strip, with each day being filled with an iconic representation of an activity321
that the individual had engaged in on that day (see Figures 1 & 2). In addition to these two ‘visible pictures’322
there was a ‘Covered picture’. Participants were told that one of the three pictures was a match for the323
presented sentence. One of the visible pictures was a ‘Target picture’, which was either consistent or324
inconsistent with the inference (‘+LIT/+INF’ vs. ‘+LIT/-INF’ condition).12 The second visible picture325
was a distractor and so was incompatible with both possible interpretations. Participants were told that if326
neither of the visible pictures were a good match, then they should select the Covered picture.327
(38) John didn’t always go to the movies last week.328
The +LIT/+INF Target picture depicts the character going to the movies on several days, making it329
consistent with the ‘sometimes’ implicature of ‘not always’. In contrast, the +LIT/-INF Target picture330
depicts the character never going to the movies, making it inconsistent with this implicature. By comparing331
the RTs associated with Target choices in these two conditions Romoli and Schwarz (2015) were able to332
compare the processing of different interpretations based on the same type of response.13333
Similarly, for the stop condition, participants would evaluate sentences like (39) against one of the two334
overt pictures in Figure 2, a distractor picture and a Covered picture. Again the +LIT/+INF Target picture335
was compatible with the inference interpretation of the sentence, while the +LIT/-INF Target picture was336
only compatible with the no-inference interpretation.337
(39) John didn’t stop going to the movies on Wednesday.338
Unsurprisingly, the Target picture in the +LIT/+INF condition was chosen at ceiling level, while the339
+LIT/-INF condition yielded more mixed results. But most importantly, the RT results for Target choices340
were uniform for Ps and SIs, as schematized in (40), in that RTs in the +LIT/+INF conditions were341
significantly faster than in the +LIT/-INF conditions, in contrast with the findings discussed above. (Note342
that while the +LIT/+INF picture could be accepted on either a no-inference or an inference interpretation,343
the difference in RTs suggests that at least a sizable portion of Target choices was based on the latter; this344
assumption justifies the use of ‘inference’ and ‘no-inference’ in the schematic illustration below, and will345
also be utilized in the data analysis of the experiments in the next section.)346
12 Romoli and Schwarz (2015) label the conditions INFERENCE-TRUE and INFERENCE-FALSE respectively; we choose the more transparent labels here to
clearly signal that the images shown in the former can in principle be accepted on either a literal or an inference interpretation.
13 Note that, in principle, selection of the +LIT/+INF Target picture could also be motivated by a no-inference/literal interpretation. However, if all these
selections were based on such an interpretation, then we would expect participants’ behavior in these two conditions to be equivalent. Therefore, the fact that
Romoli and Schwarz (2015) found substantial variance in the RT results, suggests that, at least a sizable portion of Target picture selections in the relevant
condition are motivated by inference interpretations.
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WedTues Thur FriMon
(i) Stop-Target (+LIT/+INF)
WedTues Thur FriMon
(ii) Stop-Target (+LIT/-INF)
Figure 2. Target pictures for stop conditions for a sentence like (39).
(40) a. Romoli and Schwarz 2015 on indirect SIs347
inference < no-inference.348
b. Romoli and Schwarz 2015 on Ps349
inference < no-inference.350
Note that the results for Ps here seem to be in-line with those in Chemla and Bott (2013), in that inference351
readings were faster than no-inference readings. The result for indirect SIs, however, is puzzling in that it352
appears to be exactly the opposite of what Cremers and Chemla (2014) find in their experiment 2. Moreover,353
with regards to our main question in (7), these results suggest that Ps and SIs (at least indirect ones) do354
not differ in their RT patterns after all, which would be consistent with a uniform account of SIs and Ps.355
This raises the question of what is behind these seemingly conflicting findings. One possibility relates to356
differences in the types of responses that were compared between these studies. As mentioned, previous357
response time studies generally explored the relevant inferences by comparing ‘true’ responses to ‘false’358
responses. And, while Cremers and Chemla (2014) attempted to control for any effect of response-type,359
the more reliable way of controlling for such an effect is to compare the same kind of responses, which360
the setup of Romoli and Schwarz (2015) made possible. To put it another way, Romoli and Schwarz361
(2015) raise the possibility that the method employed by previous studies may have been undermined by a362
confound. Specifically that, rather than only being influenced by the interpretations of interest, participants’363
responses may have also been influenced by the nature of the response provided (i.e. sentence acceptance364
vs. rejection). The experiments reported in the next sections were designed to investigate this issue by365
further exploring the relationship between Ps and SIs.366
4 THE EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we report on three series of experiments testing the two predictions of the SI approach to Ps367
outlined in (6-a) and (6-b).368
4.1 Experiment Ia369
The first experiment adopted the approach taken in Romoli and Schwarz (2015) and applied it to370
investigating whether there are processing pattern differences between direct and indirect implicatures371
when we compare alike responses.14 This allows for a more comprehensive comparison to the results from372
Bott and Noveck (2004) and Cremers and Chemla (2014) on the one hand, and Romoli and Schwarz (2015)373
on the other. It also offers a more comprehensive perspective on the role of response type in RT patterns.374
Note that, for this experiment (and Experiment Ib), the relevant uniformity prediction is that the relative375
14 This experiment was first reported in Schwarz et al. (2015), from which this subsection is adapted.
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WedTues Thur FriMon
a.
+LIT/-INF
-LIT/+INF
WedTues Thur FriMon
b.
+LIT/+INF
+LIT/+INF
WedTues Thur FriMon
c.
-LIT/+INF (DSI)
+LIT/-INF (ISI)
(i) John sometimes went to the movies John didn’t always go (DSI)
(ii) John didn’t always go to the movies John sometimes went (ISI)
Figure 3. Target Picture versions and conditions for Experiment 1.
processing patterns of each trigger will be similar. That is, the prediction is not that the RTs will be exactly376
the same as the relevant triggers differ substantially in other ways; namely, the presence of negation in one377
and not the other. Instead, the prediction is that the overall RT pattern, created by comparing inference and378
no-inference interpretations, will be similar. To gain a full comparison, we looked at both target choices379
(acceptance judgments) based on inference and no-inference interpretations, and Covered picture choices380
(rejection judgments) based on both types of interpretation.381
4.1.1 Methods382
4.1.1.1 Materials & Design383
Following Romoli and Schwarz (2015), we used the Covered picture paradigm (Huang et al., 2013), with384
both response choices and RTs as dependent variables. Participants were presented with two pictures, one385
of which was simply black and was introduced as covering a hidden picture.15 The instructions provided386
a detective scenario, where information about a suspect was presented as having been extracted from387
intercepted communication, and the participant’s task was to decide which of two potential culprits fit the388
provided description. It was explicitly stated that only one of the two pictures would match the description,389
so that the Covered picture should only be chosen in situations where the overt picture did not match390
the sentence. We believed this setup would increase the chance of participants basing their responses391
on no-inference interpretations for the following reasons: First, the described source of the information392
remained opaque due to its nature of stemming from intercepted communication, which makes it uncertain393
whether the speaker of that sentence was fully informed. Secondly, the emphasis that only one picture would394
match the description provided by the sentence should increase target choices for +LIT/-INF pictures,395
on the assumption that no-inference interpretations are in principle available but generally somewhat396
dispreferred.16 That is, as the Covered picture could be completely ‘False’, if there is a possible reading397
that makes the Target picture ‘True’ the participant has a good reason to go with that reading, even if it is a398
dispreferred reading. At the same time, as noted above, having the Covered Picture as a response option399
ensures that subjects need not feel forced to give a response that they may feel uncomfortable about.400
15 Note that, unlike Romoli and Schwarz (2015), we didn’t include a ‘distractor picture’. This change was done merely to simplify the material and was not
expected to have any substantive effect on the results.
16 While work such as Van Tiel et al. (2016) has shown considerable variability in this preference between SIs, this work and others (e.g., Noveck (2001);
Papafragou and Musolino (2003); Foppolo and Marelli (2017)) seems to suggest that, for the SI associated with the ‘some/all’ scale, it is indeed the case that the
no-inference interpretation tends to be dispreferred.
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The basic logic of the design was parallel to that of Romoli and Schwarz (2015), in that the overt Target401
picture either was consistent with a given interpretation or not. More concretely, sentences (i) and (ii)402
in Figure 3 were displayed with one of the pictures in Figure 3 and a Covered picture.17 For the DSI403
condition with sometimes, the picture in Figure 3a is only compatible with a no-inference interpretation,404
as the depicted person always went to the movies. Target choices in this case must therefore be based on405
the no-inference interpretation. Covered picture choices for this picture in turn are indicative of inference406
interpretations. The picture in Figure 3b is consistent with an inference interpretation (as well as a no-407
inference interpretation, since it is entailed by the inference interpretation), so target choices are generally408
expected here. Finally, the picture in Figure 3c is inconsistent with both interpretations, as the depicted409
individual never went to the movies, so Covered picture choices are expected here. For purposes of analysis,410
this design allowed us to compare Target and Covered picture responses to the picture in Figure 3a to Target411
and Covered picture responses in the control conditions in Figures 3b and 3c respectively. Thus, this set up412
provides a comparison between inference-based rejections (Covered picture choices for Figure 3a) and413
literal meaning based rejections (Covered picture choices for Figure 3c), as well as between no-inference414
acceptances (target choices for Figure 3a) and inference acceptances (target choices for Figure 3b, assuming415
as above that at least a sizable portion of responses here is based on an inference interpretation).416
The same general logic applies to the ISI sentences (ii), though with different mappings onto the pictures.417
The picture in Figure 3c serves as a test for no-inference interpretations, as target choices are incompatible418
with the inference that John sometimes went to the movies. Covered picture choices for this pictures in419
turn must be based on inference interpretations. The picture in Figure 3b is consistent with the inference420
interpretation (as well as a no-inference interpretation, as for DSIs), and the picture in Figure 3a is421
inconsistent with either interpretation. So in the case of ISIs, Figure 3c is expected to yield a mix of target422
and Covered picture choices, depending on the interpretation participants base their judgments on in a423
given trial, which can be compared to the Covered picture and target choices in the respective control424
conditions.425
Let us expand here on our assumption about the correspondence between responses and the interpretation426
that they are based on. As pointed out already, in certain conditions, it is not clear whether certain picture427
selection choices are motivated by an inference or a no-inference interpretation. Specifically, target choices428
for Figure 3b and Covered picture choices for Figure 3c could be based on either inference or no-inference429
interpretations. This is because both interpretations are consistent with Figure 3b and inconsistent with430
Figure 3c. However, if we assume consistency in participant’s interpretations between conditions, then we431
can discern whether any of these responses are based on inference interpretations by comparing responses432
to Figures 3b & c to a condition without this ambiguity. For example, in the case of the DSIs condition,433
Figure 3a is only consistent with a no-inference interpretation. Therefore, if the participant group selects434
more covered pictures when presented with Figures like 3a than with Figures like 3c, then it is likely that at435
least some of the latter Covered picture selections were motivated by inference interpretations. Similarly,436
Target picture selections of Figure 3b can be compared with Target picture selections of 3a to determine if437
any of the former were motivated by no-inference interpretations. A similar comparison between conditions438
can be done in the ISI condition. (In addition to response patterns, differences in RTs also support this439
assumption, as noted already for Romoli and Schwarz (2015) above.)440
17 Note that the condition labels presented in Figure 3 relate to the truth-value of the two critical elements of the sentence; namely, the literal content and the
inferential content. For example, in the case of the condition ‘+Lit/-Inf’ for the DSI sentence, the picture is consistent with the literal content that John went to
the movies at least once, but is inconsistent with the inference that John didn’t always go to the movies. Moreover, in the case of the ‘-Lit/+Inf’ conditions, the
target picture should not be able to be selected, due to it not satisfying the literal content of the relevant sentence, despite the fact that it is consistent with the
inference (corresponding to the literal meaning of the paraphrase).
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Acceptance-acceptance comparison
Rejection-rejection comparison
John didn’t always go to the movies John sometimes went (ISI)
Figure 4. Acceptance-acceptance and rejection-rejection comparisons for ISI sentences
Figure 4 summarizes the two critical comparisons in the ISI conditions in the display format used in the441
experiment: no-inference acceptance vs inference acceptance (‘acceptance-acceptance’ comparison) and442
inference-rejection versus no-inference rejection (‘rejection-rejection’ comparison).443
4.1.1.2 Participants & Procedure444
35 undergraduate students from Macquarie University participated in the study. They saw 36 sentence445
picture pairs of the sort described above, with 6 items for each pairing, counterbalanced across participant446
groups. In addition, there were a total of 36 filler items; 18 were variants of the experimental items447
containing always without negation, paired with all three picture types to ensure that pictures such as448
those in Figures 3a/c were viable target choices throughout the experiment sufficiently often. There also449
were 6 items containing plain negation (e.g., John didn’t go to the movies last week.), again paired with450
the various picture types to even out choices of types of pictures. Finally, 12 items were from another451
sub-experiment containing negation and again. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were452
presented with instructions laying out the detective scenario described above. They then were shown some453
example sentences and pictures, and completed a total of 4 practice trials (none of them resembling the454
crucial experimental conditions) to ensure they understood the Covered picture setup. Throughout this455
initial phase, they were free to ask any clarification questions. After this, presentation of the experimental456
trials began.457
4.1.2 Results & Discussion458
For purposes of statistical analysis, responses were coded according to whether they were based on their459
relation to an inference reading. Target selection of the pictures in Fig. 3a (DSI) and Fig. 3c (ISI) clearly460
indicates a no-inference reading, whereas Covered Picture selection for these pictures unambiguously461
reflected an inference reading. Accurate responses in the other conditions were compatible with both462
inference and no-inference readings, but were coded in terms of the strongest reading on which they could463
be based. For example, acceptance of the Target picture in 3b was coded as an inference response, though464
of course a positive instantiation of an inference reading entails truth of a no-inference reading as well. The465
negative response towards the Target picture for the versions in Fig. 3c (DSI) and 3a (ISI), as reflected in466
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Inference Type +LIT/-INF -LIT/+INF +LIT/+INF
(Fig. 3a/c) (Fig 3c/a) (Fig 3b)
DSI 22.9 0.005 97.1
ISI 50.9 0.005 95.7
Table 1. Target choice rates in % by condition
always sometimes
3000
4000
5000
6000
+Lit/+Inf +Lit/-Inf -Lit/+Inf +Lit/+Inf +Lit/-Inf -Lit/+Inf
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Figure 5. RTs for responses by picture choice and condition. +LIT/+INF target choices and +LIT/-INF
Covered picture choices are taken to reflect inference interpretations, and +LIT/-INF target choices and
-LIT/+INF Covered picture choices no-inference interpretations.
selection of the Covered Picture, was coded as a no-inference response, though again, a negative relation of467
a no-inference reading towards a picture entails a negative relation for the inference reading as well. This468
coding decision is not crucial for the overall interpretation of the data, but we think it reflects the difference469
across conditions in terms of whether the two readings are in conflict or not reasonably well. Target choice470
proportions as well as RTs (measured from the display of the sentence, which was added to the screen471
800ms after the picture was first shown) were analyzed.472
4.1.2.1 Response rates473
Mean target selection rates are provided in Table 1. Accuracy in the conditions where both literal and474
inference interpretations led to the selection of the same image (Figures 3b/c for DSIs, Figures 3a/b for475
ISIs) were at ceiling, as expected. Both inference and no-inference (i.e. literal) interpretations occurred476
in the DSI and ISI +Lit/-Inf conditions, but inference interpretations occurred more often with DSIs than477
with ISIs, as there were fewer Target picture choices for DSIs. A planned comparison between these two478
conditions using a logistic regression mixed-effect model revealed this difference in implicature-response479
rates to be significant (β = 4.01, SE = 0.98, z = 4.07, p < .001).480
Note also that the difference between the +LIT/+INF and +LIT/-INF responses suggests that at least481
some of the Target picture selections in the former condition were a result of participants accessing an482
inference interpretation. That is, if participants were only accessing literal interpretations for our test483
sentences, you would expect the response rates in these two conditions to be the same.18484
18 Similarly, the Covered picture selections between the -LIT/+INF and +LIT/-INF conditions suggests that some of these selections in the former condition
were a result of accessing an inference interpretation.
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4.1.2.2 Response Times485
The mean RTs for all conditions are illustrated in Figure 5. Note that seeing this from the perspective of486
inference vs. no-inference interpretations as laid out above, yields a cross-over interaction pattern, showing487
that the relation between RTs for inference and no-inference interpretations depends crucially on whether488
we look at acceptances in the form of target choices or rejections in the form of Covered picture choices. In489
the former case, inference interpretations are faster than no-inference ones, while the reverse holds in the490
latter.491
To investigate this result statistically, we analysed both the DSI and ISI subsets of data as a 2 × 2492
interaction design with response (Target vs. Covered picture) and interpretation (inference vs. no-inference)493
as factors, using mixed-effect models with subjects and items as random effects, as implemented in the494
lmer function of the lme4 package in R (Bates, 2005). Following Barr et al. (2013), we used the maximal495
random effect structure that would converge, with random effect slopes for each factor, as well as the496
interaction, if possible. To assess whether inclusion of a given factor significantly improved the fit of497
the overall model, likelihood-ratio tests were performed that compared two minimally different models,498
one with the fixed effects factor in question and one without, while keeping the random effects structure499
identical (Barr et al., 2013). We report estimates, standard errors, and t-values for all models, as well as the500
χ2 and p-value from the likelihood-ratio test for individual factors. The statistical details are summarized in501
Table 2. The 2 × 2 interactions were highly significant for both ISIs and DSIs, as were the relevant simple502
effects comparing inference vs. no-inference responses by response type. Schematically, the results can be503
summarized as follows:504
(41) RT patterns for Scalar Implicatures (for both DSIs and ISIs):505
a. rejection response506
inference > no-inference507
b. acceptance response508
inference < no-inference509
The results for acceptances (Target-choices), where implicature-based responses were faster than those only510
compatible with the literal meaning, are entirely in line with the findings by Romoli and Schwarz (2015)511
for ISIs, but constitute a novel finding for DSIs. The finding that inference-based rejections (Covered512
Picture-choices) were slower for both types of implicatures prima facie seems to be in line with previous513
findings for DSIs from Bott and Noveck (2004) on, and with the findings by Cremers and Chemla (2014)514
for ISIs. However, note that the comparison we make is one between a condition where a Covered Picture515
choice can be unambiguously attributed to an inference interpretation (the equivalent of saying ‘false’ to516
Some elephants are mammals.), and a condition where the literal meaning suffices to lead to a Covered517
Picture choice, but an inference interpretation would have led to the same result (the equivalent of saying518
‘false’ to Some elephants are insects. - B&N’s control T3). Similarly, our acceptance comparison is519
between acceptances that are unambiguously based on a no-inference reading and ones where inference and520
no-inference readings yield the same result (parallel to B&N’s T2 control: Some mammals are elephants.).521
The comparison within our data that is truly on par with the crucial comparison of Bott and Noveck (2004)522
(as well as Cremers and Chemla 2014) is the one between Covered Picture choices based on an inference523
interpretation and Target choices based on a no-inference interpretation. But here, we find no significant524
difference at all.525
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DSI’s β SE t χ2 p
Interaction 2119.1 563.4 3.76 9.67 <.01
Simple Effects:
Covered Picture Choices: inference > no-inference -1418.6 534.8 -2.65 6.38 <.05
Target Choices: inference < no-inference 666.1 276.5 2.41 5.42 <.05
ISI’s
Interaction 5902.7 1793.5 3.29 9.67 <.01
Simple Effects:
Covered Picture Choices: inference > no-inference -3302.2 881.6 -3.75 7.80 <.01
Target Choices: inference < no-inference 2197.9 580.2 3.788 11.734 <.001
Table 2. Summary of response time analyses: Interaction between Picture Choice and inference status and
simple effects for relevant paired factor levels.
Now, let us consider these results in light of the SI approach to Ps’ prediction of uniform processing526
patterns between DSIs, ISIs, and Ps, (i.e., (6-b)). Once we considered the acceptance versus rejection factor,527
DSIs and ISI exhibited uniform RT patterns, contrary to initial appearances from Romoli and Schwarz528
(2015). Next, we turn to Ps considered from the same, more comprehensive perspective, to see whether this529
uniformity might extend in the manner proposed by the SI approach to Ps.530
4.2 Experiment Ib: Stop in negated sentences531
In Experiment Ib, we used the same methods as in Experiment Ia to extend the investigation above to532
Ps, and in so doing, address the main question of this paper regarding the relationship between Ps and533
SIs. That is, to test the SI approach to Ps’ prediction that the processing patterns of SIs and the relevant534
Ps should be uniform. Note that, as in Experiment Ia, the uniformity prediction that we are testing is the535
expectation that the relative processing patterns of Ps will be the same as SIs, not that the RTs will be536
exactly the same across these inferences.537
4.2.1 Methods538
4.2.1.1 Materials & Design539
We used the same Covered picture paradigm as in Experiment Ia, with two pictures and both response540
choices and RTs as dependent variables. The basic logic of the design was also identical to that of541
Experiment Ia, but this time we were looking at presuppositional sentences. The stimuli included both542
sentences with and without negation. However, as laid out in the introduction, only the case of soft triggers543
under negation lends itself to a direct comparison with SIs (and specifically ISIs). We therefore focus the544
discussion in the present section on that case. The case of ‘stop’ in affirmative sentences will be discussed545
separately in Section 4.4. An illustration of the negative conditions is provided in Fig. 6. The sentence in546
Figure 6 was displayed with one of the pictures in Figure 6 and a Covered picture.547
The picture in Figure 6a, paired with the negative ‘stop’ sentence, constitutes the Target-selection control,548
as both the putative presupposition (that John went to the movies before Wednesday) and the asserted part549
(that he went to the movies from Wednesday on) are true. The picture in Figure 6c provides the Covered550
Picture-selection control, as the asserted part is false (since he did stop going to the movies), although the551
presupposition is true. Figure 6b constitutes the critical case, as the putative presupposition is false, while552
the assertion is true. If a participant accesses an inference interpretation, the Covered Picture should be553
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a.
+LIT/+INF
b.
+LIT/-INF
c.
-LIT/+INF
John didn’t stop going to the movies on Wednesday
 John used to go to the movies before Wednesday
Figure 6. Target Picture versions and conditions
chosen. If a participant accesses a no-inference interpretation the Target picture should be selected. As in554
Experiment Ia, responses to Figure 6b were coded as inference and no-inference responses respectively,555
based on whether the Covered picture or the Target picture was selected. Figures 6a and c were taken to556
provide controls with the same response for the respective critical trials.557
4.2.1.2 Participants & Procedure558
34 undergraduate students from the University of Pennsylvania participated in this study for course credit.559
Each saw 6 sentences in the +LIT/-INF and 6 in the -LIT/+INF conditions, and these were drawn from560
a total of 24 sentences. The other 12 were shown in the affirmative condition (discussed below), and the561
condition in which a given item was shown was counterbalanced across four groups of subjects. Another 12562
items were presented in the +LIT/+INF condition, again drawn from a total of 24, with counter-balancing563
between it and an affirmative variant. In addition, there were 21 fillers from another sub-experiment.564
Instructions and practice trials were as described for Experiment Ia.565
4.2.2 Results & Discussion566
4.2.2.1 Response rates567
Unsurprisingly, the Target-selection rates for the control conditions were at ceiling and floor for the568
respective control conditions. In the critical condition, the Target was selected 62% of the time, which was569
significantly higher than in the -LIT/+INF control (β = −4.63, SE = 0.82, z = −5.63, p < .001), but570
also significantly lower than in the +LIT/+INF control (β = 3.11, SE = 0.71, z = 4.38, p < .001).571
4.2.2.2 Response times572
The RT results are summarized in Fig. 7. We find a pattern that is generally parallel to that for implicatures,573
and which corresopnds to a cross-over interaction between type of reading (inference vs no-inference) and574
type of response (acceptance vs rejection) when coded as corresponding to inference and no-inference575
interpretations as described: Target choices compatible with the inference were faster than those only576
compatible with a no-inference reading, and Covered Picture choices based on the falsity of the inference577
were slower than Covered Picture choices (which could be) based on the falsity of literal meaning alone.578
To investigate this result statistically, we analysed the data as a 2 × 2 interaction design, using the same579
statistical analyses as detailed for Experiment Ia. The detailed results are summarized in Table 3. The 2 ×580
2 interaction was highly significant, as was the relevant simple effect comparing inference vs. no-inference581
responses for Target choices. For Covered Picture choices, there was a numerical effect in the same582
direction as for SIs (Inf > NoInf), but this did not reach significance.583
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Figure 7. RTs for responses by picture choice and inference status for stop data. RTs for always and
sometimes from Experiment Ia repeated for comparison. +LIT/+INF target choices and +LIT/-INF Covered
picture choices are taken to reflect inference interpretations, and +LIT/-INF target choices and -LIT/+INF
Covered picture choices no-inference interpretations.
P’s β SE t χ2 p
Interaction 3088.2 592.1 5.22 19.66 <.001
Simple Effects:
Covered Picture Choices: inference > no-inference -772.9 515.5 -1.50 2.16 = .14
Target Choices: inference < no-inference -2340.0 431.7 -5.42 21.55 <.001
Table 3. Summary of response time analyses for Experiment Ib: Interaction between Picture Choice and
inference status and simple effects for relevant paired factor levels.
The first finding extends the findings in Romoli and Schwarz (2015) and our Experiment Ia to the domain584
of presuppositions, as inference interpretations seem to be faster than no-inference ones when looking at585
acceptance judgments. The direction of the RT effect for Covered Picture responses seems parallel to the586
SI-results in Bott and Noveck (2004) and Cremers and Chemla (2014), again extended to presuppositional587
inferences. However, as in the case with SIs, it’s worth noting that the more direct comparison with these588
previous studies would be between Target choices based on a no-inference interpretation and Covered589
Picture choices based on an inference interpretation, and we find no difference here, parallel to the case of590
SIs. Thus, our result here differs from both the previous findings for SIs as well as those for Ps by Chemla591
and Bott (2013), but the results are parallel to our findings for SIs in Experiment Ia. In sum, based on the592
results from Experiments Ia and Ib, we find no difference in the processing patterns (measured through593
RTs) of Ps, DSIs or ISIs. This is consistent with the SI approach to Ps’ prediction of uniformity between594
SIs and Ps (i.e. (6-b)). Next we turn to investigating the effect of one more variable, that of prosody, on595
these inferences, as a further test of their uniformity.596
4.3 Experiment II: The effect of prosody on inference interpretations597
It has been observed in the literature that prosodic focus interacts with both SIs and Ps. In particular,598
in the case of ISI, stress on the scalar terms trigger has been argued to be necessary for the felicity of a599
reading without the inference (ie. also described as ‘cancellation’ of the implicature; see Horn 1989; Fox600
and Spector 2009 and references therein).601
(42) John didn’t ALWAYS go to the movies.602
As for presuppositions, it has also been observed that stress on the trigger changes the availability of603
the inference reading (see Beaver 2010; Abusch 2002; Simons et al. 2017; Abrusa´n 2014; Romoli 2012;604
Esipova 2018). In cases of negation like (43), stress on the trigger has also been associated with less605
inference interpretations.606
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(43) John didn’t STOP going to the movies.607
There are ongoing debates about the precise role of prosody in cases (42) and (43) and how it interacts with608
the mechanisms for deriving implicatures and presuppositions. All that matters for current purposes is that609
according to the SI approach to Ps, we expect stress to play a parallel role for SIs and (the relevant type of)610
Ps. That is, on this approach the derivation of (indirect) implicatures and (‘projecting’) presuppositions611
under negation proceeds in entirely parallel ways, and thus should be modulated in the same way by612
variations of the prosody. A traditional approach, on the other hand, can more easily accommodate a613
difference in the effect of prosody on the two inferences.614
In order to assess this prediction, we conducted an experiment comparing written stimuli to auditory615
ones, which either had neutral intonation or prosodic stress placed on the expression giving rise to the616
implicature or presupposition. The setup is overall parallel to that above, with a sentence-picture matching617
task that included a Covered Picture.19618
4.3.1 Methods619
4.3.1.1 Materials & Design620
The sentences were slight variations of those above, with a more uniform wording for the always and621
stop-versions:622
(44) a. John didn’t stop going to the movies this week.623
b. John didn’t always go to the movies this week.624
These were presented along with one of the picture variations in Figure 8 and a Covered Picture as the625
alternative choice. As before, the +LIT/-INF pictures can only be accepted if the judgment is based on626
a reading that lacks the respective inferences. In the WRITTEN condition, the sentences in (44) were627
presented as text on the screen. For the auditory conditions, we used audio recordings of the sentences in628
(44). In the NO-STRESS condition, a neutral prosody, as would be appropriate in an all-new context, was629
used. In the STRESS condition, always and stop bore the main pitch accent of the sentence.630
In addition to 24 critical items, there were 48 fillers, 9 using stop with negation and Covered Picture-631
choices, 15 with affirmative stop (8 Target and 7 Covered Picture Choices), as well as 24 items replicating632
that pattern for always.633
4.3.1.2 Participants & Procedure634
The design was between-groups, so each participant was only exposed to one mode of presentation635
(WRITTEN, NO-STRESS, STRESS). The NO-STRESS data was collected as part of an eye-tracking636
experiment, but we only focus on the response patterns here.20 A total of 97 undergraduate students from637
the University of Pennsylvania participated in the experiments for course credit (23 in WRITTEN, 27 in638
STRESS, and 47 in NOSTRESS). Instructions and practice trials were parallel to those for the previous639
19 Note that this experiment is different from the previous two in that we are no longer looking for uniformity in processing patterns. Instead we are investigating
whether there is uniformity in the response of these inferences to prosodic stress, measured through rates of derivation. While the measure is different, the
SI approach to Ps’ prediction is similar to that made for Experiments Ia and b; namely, that there will be uniform effects of prosodic stress on the pattern of
derivation rates. That is, we do not take this approach to be requiring that the effect needs to be to the same extent for both these inferences, just that it needs to
be in the same direction.
20 As will be detailed below, there were very few Target choices in the +LIT/-INF condition for stop here, which prevented any meaningful eye tracking data
analysis for the trials of interest.
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(i) Stop-Target (+LIT/+INF)
(iii) Always-Target (+LIT/+INF)
(iv) Stop-Target (+LIT/-INF)
(ii) Always-Target (+LIT/-INF)
Figure 8. Target pictures for Experiment II.
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Figure 9. Target selection rates across conditions for the WRITTEN, NO-STRESS, and STRESS variants.
experiments. Participants saw a total of 72 trials, and the 4 conditions of the 24 critical items were640
counter-balanced across groups of participants.641
4.3.2 Results & Discussion642
The dependent variable of main interest for this study was response rates, as we were interested in643
assessing the impact of prosody on the prevalence of inference interpretations. The overall response644
patterns across conditions are illustrated in Figure 9. The key observation is that we find variation in the645
frequency of target choices in the +LIT/-INF condition across different stimulus presentation types. In the646
NOSTRESS condition with auditory stimuli using neutral prosody, target acceptances seem to be lower than647
in the WRITTEN condition, indicating a greater prevalence of inference interpretations, for both always648
and stop. However, in the STRESS condition, we find the opposite effect for stop, as the marked prosody649
increased the availability of no-inference interpretations.650
To assess the main contrasts of theoretical interest statistically, we conducted 2×3 mixed-effect model651
logistic regression analyses using treatment coding on the data for the +LIT/-INF conditions, with varying652
baselines to assess different simple effects. Comparing the WRITTEN version to the NOSTRESS version653
confirmed a significant decrease in Target-acceptances for both stop (β = −4.85, SE = 1.23, z = −3.96,654
p < .001) and always (β = −3.98, SE = 1.18, z = −3.36, p < .001). The interaction term for this655
comparison did not reach significance (p = 0.12), but there is a significant simple effect with fewer Target656
acceptances for stop than for always in the NOSTRESS condition (β = 1.42, SE = 0.40, z = 3.53,657
p < .001). Turning to a comparison of the WRITTEN condition and the STRESS condition, there was a658
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significant increase in Target acceptances for stop (β = 2.49, SE = 1.23, z = −2.03, p < .05), and a659
marginally significant decrease for always (β = −2.39, SE = 1.25, z = −1.91, p < .1). In addition,660
there was a significant interaction (β = −4.89, SE = 0.69, z = −7.07, p < .001). Comparing the661
STRESS and NOSTRESS conditions directly revealed more Target acceptances for stop sentences in the662
STRESS condition (β = 7.35, SE = 1.21, z = 6.07, p < .001), while their was no difference between663
these condition for always sentences. Finally, the interaction term for this comparison was also significant664
(β = 5.76, SE = 0.70, z = 8.21, p < .001).665
The outcome pattern for the prosodic manipulations is striking, and entirely unexpected from the666
perspective of the SI approach to Ps, at least in the strong version we are focusing on here. If presuppositions667
and implicatures are derived in parallel ways based on reasoning over alternatives, then prosodic stress668
on the inference-triggering expression should have parallel effects. However, for always, we find that669
auditory stimuli in general increase the availability of inference interpretations. And at least numerically,670
in our results stress increases the likelihood of inference interpretations for implicature-triggers rather671
than decreasing it (although this effect did not come out as significant in our analyses).21 The effects672
for stop, on the other hand, go in opposite directions based on whether it is stressed or unstressed in the673
auditory versions. The latter leads to an increase in inference interpretations, whereas the former leads to a674
decrease. This last result is in line with the observations in the literature mentioned above, about stress675
on presuppositional trigger leading to an increase in no-inference interpretations. Most important for our676
purposes is the different effect of prosody on SIs and Ps, which is unexpected by the SI approach to Ps.677
This difference in the effect of prosody on SIs and Ps provides a first clear argument against a unified678
analysis of the derivation of these inferences. In contrast, these results are perfectly compatible with a679
more traditional view that sees them as theoretically very different cases. The next section presents further680
evidence along the same lines, produced as a result of evaluating the other identified prediction made by681
the SI approach to Ps. Namely, that in affirmative contexts, Ps and entailments should behave uniformly682
(i.e. (6-a)).683
Before that, however, let us mention briefly how these results relate with the work on ‘scalar diversity’684
done by Van Tiel et al. (2016) (among others). This work has shown substantial variation in the derivation685
rates of different scalar implicatures. One might wonder whether the difference we have found between686
SIs and Ps might ‘just’ be a sign of this scalar diversity, rather than evidence of different derivational687
mechanisms. However, the fact that the prosodic stress appears to have, not just different, but opposite688
effects on the derivation rates of these inferences is more in-line with a qualitative distinction between689
them (a` la different derivational mechanisms), than a quantitative difference (a` la scalar diversity).690
4.4 Experiment IIIa: Stop in affirmative sentences691
4.4.1 Motivations692
We set out to test the predictions of the SI approach to Ps, as presented in (6-a) and (6-b). Turning to693
the former, the approach sees Ps as simple entailments. This feature of SI approaches to Ps predicts that694
- everything else being equal - the inference traditionally considered to be a P should be entirely on par695
with other entailed content (6-a). That is, they predict uniformity between Ps and simple entailments in696
affirmative contexts. For example, according to the SI approach to Ps, stop in the following sentence is697
assumed to entail (and only to entail) both of the following:698
21 Note however that this result is still compatible with the claim in the literature that stress on the trigger is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
no-inference interpretation to become available.
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John stopped going to the movies on Wednesday.
Figure 10. Visual stimuli for inference vs. basic entailment-based rejections of stop in affirmative contexts
(45) John stopped going to the movies on Wednesday.699
a. John did not go to the movies from Wednesday on.700
b. John did go to the movies before.701
Both these inferences are derived from the same sentence and, according to the SI approach to Ps, they are702
equivalent in status (i.e. they are both simply entailed). As a result, we take it that the SI approach to Ps703
would predict a greater degree of uniformity in the behavior of these inferences, compared to others we704
have investigated thus far. In particular, we take it that the SI approach to Ps predicts that rejecting a picture705
based on one of these should be just as fast as for the other. In contrast, traditional accounts posit that while706
both (45-a) and (45-b) are entailed by (45), (45-b) is also presupposed by (45) and thus differs in status707
from the first. More precisely, the fact that (45-b) is both entailed and presupposed might lead to different708
patterns in behavioral data than (45-a), which is simply entailed (see Kim 2007 and Schwarz 2016b for709
previous instances of this approach to only and definites, respectively). We investigated the relationship710
between rejections based on either one of these two inferences in affirmative sentences.711
4.4.2 Methods712
4.4.2.1 Materials & Design713
The materials of this experiment were part of the same overall experiment reported as Experiment Ib on714
stop in negative sentences above. Affirmative sentences with a presupposition trigger such as stop differ715
from those with DSIs in that they cannot be judged true in a context where the inference of interest (that716
the relevant activity had been going on before) is false. This renders such sentences unsuitable for a direct717
comparison with affirmative SI sentences (i.e., DSIs), but they provide a possible angle for assessing the718
status of the inference. Note first that rejection responses in such contexts are captured on both traditional719
accounts and the SI approach to Ps, though in different ways: the former sees it as a case of presupposition720
failure, whereas the latter sees it as a simple rejection based on unmet entailments. The contexts we used721
are depicted in Fig. 10. In the -LIT/+INF condition, the overt picture does not match the sentence based on722
its simply entailed content, since the movie-going continued past Wednesday, but the inference that John723
was going to the movies before Wednesday is met. In contrast, in the +LIT/-INF condition, the inference724
— be it both a presupposition and an entailment, or merely an entailment — is not met, while the simply725
entailed content, that there was no ‘movie-going’ after Wednesday, does hold.726
4.4.2.2 Participants & Procedure727
The data stem from the same 34 participants as in Experiment Ib, and the sentence-picture combinations728
that they saw were variants of the negative versions reported there. In particular, subjects saw 6 sentences729
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Figure 11. Experiment II (‘stop’) RTs for rejections in the Inference False and Inference True conditions.
in the -LIT/+INF condition and 6 in the +LIT/-INF condition, drawn from a total of 24 sentences,730
counterbalanced across groups as described above. The Instructions and procedure were as laid out for731
Experiment Ib, (see section 4.2.1).732
4.4.3 Results & Discussion733
Unsurprisingly, Covered Picture selections were at ceiling level (over 97% for both conditions). RTs734
are illustrated in Fig. 11. Covered Picture choices were slower in the +LIT/-INF condition (3296ms) than735
in the -LIT/+INF condition (2583ms). This difference was statistically significant, as confirmed by a736
mixed-effect regression analysis with random effects for subjects and items, including intercepts and slopes737
(β = −689.6, SE = 203.1, t = −3.40, χ2 = 9.48, p < .01).738
The observed difference in RTs points to a difference between the two ingredients of meaning at play. This739
pattern is not predicted by the SI approach to Ps, which would expect uniformity between these conditions,740
(6-a). On the other hand, it fits quite naturally with a traditional account, where one is presupposed and741
entailed, while, the other is simply entailed. Previous findings by Kim (2007) and Schwarz (2016b) have742
shown that rejection of sentences based on presupposed material is slower than rejection based on entailed743
content, and the present results fits into that picture straightforwardly on the traditional view. The SI744
approach to Ps does not offer an obvious explanation for this difference, as it sees both aspects of the745
meaning of (45) as simple entailments. However, one way of potentially saving the SI approach to Ps746
would be to challenge the assumption implicit in this interpretation of the data, namely that entailments of747
a sentence (that are generally comparable, specifically with regards to the task at hand), are on par with one748
another, specifically with respect to behavioral patterns such as those in RT results. An obvious approach749
to test this in light of our previous comparisons between always and stop is to look at different falsifying750
scenarios for the former. If we also find a difference between corresponding entailments associated with751
sentences containing always, then our current result for sentences containing stop would be less problematic752
for the SI approach to Ps.753
4.5 Experiment IIIb and c: Rejections of always based on different entailments754
When we compared sentences with always to ones with stop under negation, there were two ingredients755
of the overall conveyed meaning, which differed in status when occurring under negation:756
(46) John didn’t always go to the movies.757
a. There were times when John did not go to the movies.758
b. John sometimes went to the movies.759
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ALWAYS PICTURE NEVER PICTURE ALWAYS PICTURE NEVER PICTURE
Always Follow-up 1 Always Follow-up 2
John always went to the movies this week.
Figure 12. Follow-up experiments on rejections of always-sentences
The inferences in (46-a) and (46-b) are traditionally analyzed as an entailment and an SI, respectively.760
However, in the case of an affirmative always sentence like (47) both (46-b) and the negation of (46-a)761
(i.e. (47-a)) are entailed. This makes affirmative sentences like (47) a good test for the assumption that762
different aspects of the entailments of a sentence yield equivalent RT results when providing the grounds763
for rejection of the sentence.764
(47) John always went to the movies.765
a. It’s not the case that there are times when John did not go to the movies.766
Two follow-up experiments looked at rejections of positive always-sentences based on pictures767
corresponding to the two entailments in question. The design is illustrated in Fig. 12.768
The crucial manipulation was whether the always sentence was falsified by an overt picture where the769
depicted individual sometimes went to the movies or whether they never went to the movies. If the two770
different aspects of the overall entailments of the sentences involved an asymmetry parallel to that found771
for the two ingredients of stop-sentences, then we would expect a similar RT-difference between the two772
conditions. In contrast, if no such difference is involved, we expect no RT-contrast, and an interaction773
with the results for stop. The latter prediction was borne out. RTs for the ALWAYS PICTURE (2383ms)774
and the NEVER PICTURE (2321ms) did not differ significantly from one another. Comparing the results775
statistically to those for stop reported above (analyzed as a between-subjects, within-items design with a776
maximal random effects structure for the latter) yielded a significant interaction (β = 743.1, SE = 224.5,777
t = −3.31, χ2 = 9.12, p < .01).778
A potential concern about this first follow-up is that it involved empty calendar slots. In particular, one779
might worry that the NEVER PICTURE version, which conceptually corresponded to the more difficult780
stop-condition with an unmet presupposition, might lend itself to a relatively easy task-strategy of rejection781
based on the completely empty calendar strip, thus hiding potential delay effects. A second follow-up782
addressed this issue by filling the relevant calendar slots with another image type instead (see right side783
of Fig 12). While there was a small numerical difference between the ALWAYS PICTURE (5505ms) and784
the NEVER PICTURE (5735ms) in the results of this experiment, the difference was not statistically785
significant.22 Comparing these results to the data obtained for stop from above, we again find a statistical786
interaction (β = 156.13, SE = 72.93, t = −2.14, χ2 = 4.48, p < .05)787
22 Note that the overall longer RTs here are due to a slight variation in task, where a context sentence was included and the events in the calendar were revealed
in two steps. Since the main measures of interest are a comparison between the two always-conditions and the interaction, this main effect of the task does not
affect the interpretation of the results for our purposes.
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What both of these follow-ups suggest, then, is that while there is an asymmetry in the role of the two788
inferences in question in the case of stop, this is not the case for the different aspects of the entailments789
of always. While this of course does not conclusively show that all entailments have the same processing790
status, it further suggests that in the case of stop, we are not dealing with two aspects of the overall791
entailment, as posited by the SI approach to Ps. In contrast, these results are consistent with the traditional792
perspective that the relevant inferences associated with affirmative stop sentences (i.e. (45)) have different793
statuses (i.e. simply entailed vs. entailed and presupposed).794
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
We set out to investigate the SI approach to Ps by trying to answer the main question outlined in (48).795
The predictions of the SI approach to Ps in regards to this question are repeated in (49-a) and (49-b).796
Experiment Ia, Ib and II set out to test prediction in (49-b). Experiments IIIa-c tested the prediction in797
(49-a).798
(48) Main question: Do behavioral patterns in experimental data, e.g., in terms of (RTs) and response799
patterns, yield evidence for a distinction between Ps and entailments in affirmative contexts and800
between Ps and SIs in other contexts?801
(49) Predictions: All else being equal,802
a. In affirmative contexts, Ps and entailments should behave uniformly.803
b. In all other contexts, Ps and SIs should behave uniformly.804
First, we will focus on Experiments Ia and Ib, as these produced results that were consistent with the805
prediction in (49-b). Following this, we will consider the other experiments, which produced results that806
were not in line with the predictions in (49-a) and (49-b), and discuss the challenge they pose for the SI807
approach to Ps.808
5.1 What doesn’t challenge the SI approach to Ps809
To briefly recap the situation in the literature, the classic finding since Bott and Noveck (2004) is that810
rejecting a sentence when its SI is false takes more time than accepting it. The same paradigm was then811
applied to Ps by Chemla and Bott (2013) and they found the opposite result: rejecting a negated sentence812
whose presupposition is not globally met takes less time than accepting it. On the basis of this result,813
Chemla and Bott (2013) concluded that Ps, unlike SIs, are not associated with a delay and that the answer814
to the question in (48) is positive: the processing of Ps and SIs is different, which in turn is a challenge for815
unified accounts like the SI approach to Ps. On the other hand, Romoli and Schwarz (2015) found that816
accepting negated sentences with a true presupposition is faster than accepting it when its P is not satisfied817
in the context, and they found parallel results for SIs, with faster acceptance of inference interpretations818
than no-inference interpretations. On the basis of this result, these authors concluded that there is no clear819
overall evidence for either SIs or Ps being associated with a delay or for the two inferences being different.820
On the face of it, the results from these two studies appear in conflict and they seem to give us opposite821
answers to the question of whether Ps and SIs differ. However, there is an obvious difference between822
these studies, which could account for the different results produced. Specifically, the two studies looked at823
different comparisons across acceptance and rejection responses; while Chemla and Bott (2013) compared824
acceptance versus rejection responses of the same item, Romoli and Schwarz (2015) compared acceptance825
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versus acceptance responses across different items. Gaining a comprehensive comparative perspective826
required looking at both acceptance and rejection responses systematically, and this constituted the main827
motivation for Experiment Ia and Ib.828
In Experiment Ia, we compared direct and indirect SIs using the paradigm from Romoli and Schwarz829
(2015), to test whether their finding was specific to indirect SIs. Moreover, we extended their approach by830
comparing both acceptance versus acceptance responses as well as rejection versus rejection responses831
across items. Both direct and indirect SIs yielded faster responses in the inference condition than in the832
no-inference condition when we considered acceptance responses, thus replicating Romoli and Schwarz833
(2015) on indirect SIs and extending their results to direct ones. On the other hand, looking at rejections834
yielded the opposite pattern, as rejections in the inference condition were slower than in the no-inference835
condition. Thus, we find uniformity between direct and indirect SIs and we also reconcile the findings836
of Chemla and Bott (2013) and Romoli and Schwarz (2015) to some extent.23 In Experiment Ib, we837
extended the same paradigm to Ps, by looking at sentences with stop under negation. The RT pattern838
was parallel to that for SIs, with a cross-over interaction reflecting opposite patterns for acceptance and839
rejection responses.24840
The uniformity in the overall shape of the RT patterns of direct SIs, indirect SIs and Ps in these841
experiments is in line with the prediction in (49-b) and thus provides no evidence against the SIs approach842
to Ps. Moreover, we found no evidence for either Ps or SIs being associated with a delay in RTs, a point843
that we will return to in a moment.844
5.2 What does challenge the SI approach to Ps845
In Experiment II, we investigated the effect of prosody on the availability of inference interpretations for846
SIs and Ps. In contrast to the results from Experiment Ia and Ib, the results of Experiment II went against847
the prediction in (49-b). That is, Experiment II found directly opposite effects of placing prosodic stress on848
the inference-triggering expressions for SIs and Ps: inference rates decreased for SIs, relative to written849
stimuli, but increased for Ps. These results run against the SI approach to Ps’ prediction of uniformity of850
behavior across these inferences.851
With regards to the first prediction of the SI approach to Ps’ (49-a), namely that in affirmative contexts,852
elements of meaning that have traditionally been thought of as Ps and entailments should behave uniformly.853
This prediction stems from the fact that the SI approach to Ps analyses the relevant inferences as simple854
entailments, and was addressed by Experiments IIIa-c. Experiment IIIa tested prediction (49-a) by855
comparing the entailment and the presupposition of ‘stop’ in affirmative sentences. Specifically, it compared856
the behavior (measured as RTs) of participants who were rejecting a picture based on the notions that857
something was happening before or that it is not happening any longer, respectively. As the SI approach858
to Ps treats both of these elements of meaning as simple entailments, it did not predict a difference in859
RT behavior between these conditions. On the other hand, the traditional approach makes no specific860
predictions in regard to this comparison, but is perfectly compatible with there being a difference between861
the two. Experiment IIIa found a difference in the RTs associated with these different rejection responses,862
with slower responses for presupposition-based rejections, in line with previous findings (Kim, 2007;863
Schwarz, 2016b). This result is consistent with the traditional approach to Ps, but is a challenge for the SI864
23 Note that, while as far as RTs are concerned our results are comparable for ISIs and DSIs, the rate of implicature interpretations is significantly higher for
DSIs. It’s possible that this is simply due to complexities introduced by negation, but a more detailed explanation will have to be fleshed out in future work.
24 Note that these results touch on an issue that has been investigated in detail elsewhere; namely, the effect of accepting/rejecting positive/negative sentences.
In general, the work in this area seems to be consistent with our results, in that, judging sentences as true has been found to take longer than judging them as
false (Wason, 1959). For a recent summary of the relevant literature see Dale and Duran (2011).
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approach to Ps. One way the SI approach to Ps could overcome this challenge would be to argue that not all865
simple entailments are on a par with one another with regard to RT behavior patterns, and so, Experiment866
IIIa’s result should not be taken as indicative of a difference in their nature (i.e., they could still both be867
simple entailments of ‘stop’). Experiment IIIb and IIIc set out to explore this proposal by comparing the868
RTs associated with rejections based on two elements of meaning that have both been traditionally analysed869
as simple entailments of ‘always’. These experiments found no difference in the RT behavior of rejections870
based on these two different simple entailments. These results make the possible explanation of Experiment871
IIIa’s results (that different simple entailments have differing RT patterns) by the SI approach to Ps less872
plausible. As this approach would now need to also explain why the RT behavior of the simple entailments873
of ‘stop’ differed, while those of ‘always’ did not.874
It is worth considering these results in light of other recent experimental work which has also challenged875
the predictions of the SI approach to Ps. In particular, two other recent studies investigated the prediction in876
(49-b) by looking at how different populations interacted with these elements of meaning, using a Covered877
Picture selection task parallel to the one employed in the experiments reported here. Bill, Romoli, Schwarz,878
and Crain (2016) and Kennedy, Bill, Schwarz, Crain, Folli, and Romoli (2014) find that healthy adults,879
children (ranging from 4-7), and individuals with Broca’s Aphasia (BAs) relate to Ps and SIs differently.880
Healthy adults and BAs tend to respond based on an inference reading when responding to sentences881
associated with SIs, while children are more likely to access an no-inference reading. In contrast, for882
presuppositions, children and BAs pattern together and are more likely than healthy adults to respond based883
on an inference interpretation. Regardless of the exact explanation for each population’s behavior in the884
respective cases, the fact that we get a dissociation in the patterns across populations, in particular with the885
BAs patterning with different groups for Ps and SIs, goes against the prediction in (49-b). Therefore, these886
results, combined with our present results provide strong evidence against treating SIs and Ps in an entirely887
uniform manner.888
5.3 Are SIs (and Ps) associated with RT delays?889
Results such as those found by Bott and Noveck (2004) are commonly interpreted to indicate that890
implicatures require a costly computation that lead to delays in processing (Bott and Noveck, 2004; Huang891
and Snedeker, 2009a; Bott et al., 2012). Our results, on the other hand, did not involve a general delay892
in the inference conditions, for either SIs or Ps. In particular, when comparing acceptance judgments in893
Experiment Ia and Ib, cases where the Target picture was compatible with the inference interpretation were894
faster than ones where it was only compatible with the no-inference interpretation. This is incompatible895
with an account that simply posits two stages — an initial stage where only the literal meaning is available,896
and a later stage, where the inference interpretation is available — and maps these onto response time897
results. Both of the visible pictures involved in the acceptance comparison are compatible with the literal898
meaning, and thus should yield equivalent response patterns (or, if anything, a delay in the inference899
condition). In contrast with the acceptance comparison, the comparison of rejection responses yielded a900
pattern where responses based on an inference interpretation were slower. On their own, these might be901
seen as compatible with an account based on processing delays for inference interpretation. But given the902
cross-over interaction in our results, an alternative explanation of the effects is called for.903
In the following, we sketch how the RT patterns in our data can be captured in terms of a conflict between904
pragmatic principles. To begin with, the relatively rapid acceptances based on inference interpretations905
suggests that the inferences are readily available. But why should the acceptance of pictures that are only906
compatible with a no-inference interpretation be slower? It cannot be due to a delay in availability of the907
Frontiers 29
In evi
ew
Bill et al. Processing presuppositions and implicatures
no-inference interpretation since a), the inference interpretation entails the no-inference interpretation and908
b) rejections of pictures based on the no-inference reading are fast. An alternative explanation of the overall909
pattern in our data starts from the observation that delays arise precisely in those circumstances where910
the inference and no-inference interpretations conflict with one another. For example, we find relatively911
slow Target picture acceptances when the target is compatible with the no-inference interpretation but912
incompatible with the inference interpretation (Fig. 3a for DSIs, Fig. 3c for ISIs, and Fig. 6b for Ps).913
Similarly, Covered Picture selections are also slow in the very same circumstances. One possibility then, is914
that there are opposing pressures favoring the respective interpretations, and that delays arise precisely915
when there is a conflict between these factors. More specifically, we assume that comprehenders follow a916
general principle of charity, i.e., they generally try to construe utterances in such a way that they are true917
of the circumstances at hand. In our case, charity can plausibly be seen as corresponding to selecting the918
Target picture, as that is the obvious and salient option at hand. On the other hand, it is intuitively plausible919
that inference interpretations are generally preferred. For SIs, this is in line with naive speakers’ intuitions920
about the meaning of some.25 For Ps, a preference for an inference interpretation is in line with the common921
claim in the literature that interpretations including presuppositions seem to be the clear default, whereas922
no-inference interpretations are often thought to only be marginally available.923
In sum, we assume the following two principles at work:924
(50) Charity: Construe sentences as true if possible.26925
(51) Inference preference: Inference interpretations are preferred (for both SIs and Ps)926
The pressures of selecting the Target picture and the preference for inference interpretations oppose one927
another in precisely those conditions where we find a RT delay in our data. In the +LIT/-INF conditions,928
the principle of charity favors the Target picture, and the preference for inference interpretations favors the929
Covered Picture. Whether participants end up choosing the Target or the Covered Picture, their responses930
are delayed in these cases, compared to Covered Picture and Target picture selections in the relevant control931
conditions.27 It is interesting to relate this account to an idea presented by Katsos and Bishop (2011), who932
explain acquisition data in terms of pragmatic tolerance: from our perspective, one could see this in terms933
of the charity principle being stronger in children than the preference for inference interpretations.934
6 CONCLUSION
Recent proposals in the theoretical literature have put forth a unified view of a variety of inferences that935
traditionally have been seen as falling into different classes, under the umbrella of SIs. A simple and936
powerful approach to investigating these unified proposals experimentally is to compare the inferences in937
question directly to one another, using behavioral measures. Everything else being equal, unified accounts938
predict uniform behavior. This approach has been applied fruitfully to the case of free choice inferences939
(Chemla and Bott 2014; Tieu et al. 2015b) and multiplicity inferences (Tieu et al. 2015a), among others.940
We applied it to the comparison between classical SIs and Ps to investigate the uniformity prediction of941
25 Indeed, as anyone that has taught introductory logic can confirm, it takes substantial effort to convince students that some-statements are in principle
compatible with universal scenarios, i.e., that some does not literally mean some but not all.
26 In our set-up, this plays out as a pressure to select the Target picture, if possible.
27 Note that, as RT-measurements are a relatively late and global measure of linguistic processing, our results do not preclude the possibility of there also being
an initial delay associated with SI derivation, as found in studies measuring online processing more directly, such as Huang and Snedeker (2009b) and others.
Thanks to Jesse Snedeker for discussion on this point.
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recent SI approaches to Ps (Chemla 2009; Romoli 2015 among others). Previous results from the literature942
(Chemla and Bott, 2013; Romoli and Schwarz, 2015) bearing on this issue have yielded conflicting results.943
We proposed that the different results were due to differences in terms of what types of responses (in terms944
of acceptances vs. rejection responses) were compared. Our first few experiments (Ia & Ib) show that, once945
the acceptance vs rejection pattern is factored in, then, in regards to the processing patterns, there is no946
longer any clear evidence for differences between the inference types. Furthermore, these results challenge947
the common interpretation of previous RT findings that implicatures are associated with an RT-delay due to948
the cost of computing these inferences online, and we sketched an alternative perspective based on our949
results. However, when we turned to Experiment II, we found that, counter to the predictions of the SI950
approach to Ps, there was a difference in the way these inferences were affected by prosody. In Experiment951
IIIa, we tested another prediction of SI approaches to Ps, namely that the relevant inferences of sentences952
including triggers like stop are simple entailments in affirmative contexts, which (again, everything else953
being equal) predicts uniform behavior with other simply entailed content. The results of this experiment954
showed that participants were slower to select the Covered Picture based on content that is traditionally955
thought to be entailed and presupposed compared with content traditionally thought to be simply/only956
entailed. These results are not consistent with the expectations of the SI approaches to Ps. In Experiments957
IIIb and c we investigated the plausibility of a possible explanation that SI approach to Ps could use to958
account for the differences in Experiment IIIa; that different simple entailments might show differing RT959
behavior. We investigated this possible claim by comparing the RT behavior associated with two simple960
entailments of ‘always’, and found no difference between them. These results reduce the plausibility of961
Experiment IIIa’s results being accounted for with such an explanation. So, going back to the question962
of whether there is evidence from processing for a difference between SIs and Ps, we can now give it a963
positive answer: there is evidence for a difference between Ps and SIs. The first piece of evidence being964
the difference in the way Ps and SIs interact with prosody, and the second being the difference in how965
Ps and simple entailments are treated in affirmative sentences. Finally, our results link up quite nicely966
with recent evidence from the study of language acquisition (Bill, Romoli, Schwarz, and Crain, 2016) and967
Broca’s Aphasia (Kennedy, Bill, Schwarz, Crain, Folli, and Romoli, 2014), which also produced results968
differentiating SIs and Ps in terms of responses patterns across populations. Considering these past findings,969
as well as our current results, it would appear that the SI approach to Ps is faced with a genuine challenge.970
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